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Emerging forms of cross-sector collaboration in 
the Spanish innovation system  
Manuel Fernández-Esquinas and Irene Ramos-Vielba 
The Spanish innovation system has grown since the 1980s following a predominantly supply-side 
model where R&D capacities have concentrated in universities and public research organizations. 
Since then efforts have been made to stimulate cross-sector linkages. These have relied on university–
industry projects, various forms of interface organizations, technology centres and programmes to 
encourage mobility. However, initiatives have encountered some significant drawbacks. Due to a lack 
of progress, a range of centres and other collaborative arrangements have emerged since 2000 to try to 
foster greater collaboration and firm based innovation. The process of policy change and their 
institutional structure are examined in the context of current and potential impact on the national 
innovation system. 
N RECENT YEARS one of the key assumptions 
of innovation policy has been the need for cross-
sector cooperation and interactive learning. In-
novation is characterized by reciprocity and feed-
back mechanisms through which actors produce new 
combinations of ideas, capabilities, skills and re-
sources. If these interactions are poor, it has been ar-
gued, they will have a negative impact on the pace 
of innovation activities (Lundvall et al., 2002). Be-
cause research capabilities in many countries are 
heavily concentrated in the academic and govern-
ment sectors, the emphasis is often put on improving 
cross-sector research collaboration (CSRC) between 
public science and proprietary regimes, a trend that 
Bozeman (2000) calls the ‘collaboration paradigm’. 
Given the large number of instruments available 
to promote collaboration, such as project grants,  
cooperative centres, human resources programmes, 
financial aid, tax incentives, and legal reforms, the 
task of designing the most effective mechanisms to 
enhance links between sectors has attracted much 
policy attention. Governments face the problem of 
trying to promote collaboration from a wide set of 
tools that need to be adapted to the specific condi-
tions of their innovation system. However, there is 
little in the way of policy guidelines concerning the 
design of policies for different contexts. As a conse-
quence, interventions for promoting collaboration 
usually develop as a process of learning through trial 
and error. 
Some important questions follow for public poli-
cies: Are CSRC tools equally effective for different 
configurations of innovation systems? What are the 
appropriate measures for systems at different stages 
of development? 
Moreover, given that innovation policies are taken 
from multiple levels of government, there is an on-
going discussion on the instruments that national or 
regional administrations should use to support pri-
vate innovation (Fernández-Ribas, 2009; Laranja et 
al, 2008). In this multi-level governance context 
how should be the division of work be best allocated 
for promoting collaboration? 
The Spanish innovation system is an illustrative 
example of this situation. In the last 25 years scien-
tific capacity has grown considerably alongside the 
economic development of the country. Public  
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expenditure and the numbers of universities, aca-
demic researchers and scientific publications have 
increased continuously.1 At the same time, govern-
ments have implemented policies to promote 
knowledge transfer to firms following a supply-side 
model. A wide range of tools has been launched, in-
cluding grants, loans for collaborative projects, and 
several interface organizations. However, innovation 
capacity, reflected in patents, spin-offs, private ex-
penditure on R&D, researchers in firms and the 
number of innovative firms, have not increased at 
the same pace (ICONO, 2008). So CSRC incentives 
appear to have achieved little so far. 
Some specific features of the Spanish innovation 
system impede both collaboration and knowledge 
transfer. The concentration of R&D in the academic 
sector, the complexity of the multi-level policy 
framework, the special characteristics of industries 
(with a predominance of  small to medium-size en-
terprises [SMEs] and low-technology sectors), plus 
the difficulties for cross-sectoral mobility of re-
searchers, are all important limitations (Muñoz, 
2001; Sebastián and Muñoz, 2006). Several reports 
have provided descriptive overviews of interface 
mechanisms and public–private partnerships, de-
scribing an ‘implementation gap’ between science 
and innovation (FECYT, 2006; OECD, 2005b). 
However, explanations of the causes that hinder col-
laboration as well as the rationale for emerging 
trends are lacking. 
This article analyses the mechanisms and impact 
of cross-sector collaboration policies. Our main goal 
is to explain the dynamics of policies as a result of 
two important forces: the elements shaping the  
national innovation system and the actions by which 
stakeholders try to overcome the limitations of pre-
vious arrangements. The diversified set of proce-
dures and organizational structures in the Spanish 
innovation system provides a suitable setting for de-
veloping some more general insights about the fac-
tors that shape public policies and, more 
importantly, their implications for interventions to 
promote collaboration. 
Our analysis reveals a trend consisting of a shift 
from mainly project-based cooperation to more 
structured and stable forms of collaborative endeav-
ours and partnerships. Taking into account such a 
trend we confront two questions: 
 What is the policy rationale driving the trend to-
ward new forms of collaboration dynamics? And 
 Does organizational stability contribute to im-
provements in cross-sector research linkages? 
The argument we put forward is that for many years 
an ‘implementation gap’ has been caused by the bar-
riers that hinder collaboration, but also by a ‘lock-in’ 
of the main policy actors. This lock-in is caused by 
the implicit division of work resulting from the insti-
tutional building of the innovation system. Only the 
rise of new structural conditions since the 2000s has 
enabled actors to follow a different path. New forms 
of CSRC tools emerging in a bottom-up fashion are 
the result of actions by new actors that try to over-
come the failures of traditional policies, which in 
turn pose unresolved issues concerning the division 
of work. 
As an analytical strategy we use the evolutionary 
perspective of policy-making applied to the govern-
ance of innovation systems (OECD, 2005a). For our 
purposes, we combine this perspective with the con-
cept of system failure. The evolutionary aspect of 
policies suggests that public interventions result 
from exchanges of interest in the context of prevail-
ing opportunities. Collective policy-making consists 
of bargaining behaviour and negotiated outcomes 
among interested actors (March and Olsen, 1996). 
But at the same time, it is acknowledged that social 
choices are shaped and mediated by institutional ar-
rangements. Actors situated in different domains 
have different motivations when engaged in 
knowledge production and utilization. The institu-
tions play a major role in how people and firms learn 
and use their knowledge, which affects the final out-
come (Edquist and Hommen, 1999). 
Therefore, policy analysis in the innovation field 
should consider two processes. First, a country’s in-
stitutional set-up, which typically experiences its 
‘defining moment’ in the design of ministries and 
agencies, allocation of resources, competences of ac-
tors and stakeholder participations (OECD, 2005a). 
In evolutionary terms, this creates conditions for 
path dependency. Second, innovation systems are 
subject to tensions, therefore new actors are pushed 
to meet stakeholders’ requirements to compete in the 
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knowledge economy. For this reason new develop-
ments are often the result of perceived failures of 
former situations. 
System failure and research policy 
The concept of system failure provides a useful tool 
for looking at specific mechanisms that affect the 
evolution of research and innovation policies. This 
concept can be helpful for explaining why some 
CSRC policies do not interact effectively with exist-
ing practices and organizational forms. The notion 
of failure has often been used to accounts for factors 
affecting innovation processes. Several studies have 
identified barriers induced by a lack of basic infra-
structure (Edquist and Hommen, 1999), firm compe-
tence (Lhuillery and Pfister, 2009), government 
shortcomings (Komninos and Tsamis, 2008; Svarc, 
2006), regulations that hinder scientific excellence 
(Bonaccorsi, 2009) and social configurations of 
norms that shape creative processes in key produc-
tive sectors (Anchordoguy, 2000). The framework 
suggested by Woolthuis et al. (2005) is especially 
useful for integrating different types of barriers and 
identifying actors in each of them. The main types of 
processes creating systemic failure are: 
 Capability failure, concerning the competences, 
resources, and skills of both firms and science or-
ganizations; 
 Network failure, concerning the barriers to coop-
eration and flow of information between actors; 
and 
 Regulation and institutional failure, concerning 
institutions norms and non-predicted evolution of 
regulatory arrangements. 
For the purpose of this article we use the different 
failures as analytical devices to identify the mecha-
nisms that hinder the effective networking of system 
components. In addition to the macro perspective 
that is usually privileged by institutional policy 
analysis, we argue that it is necessary to descend to 
the micro level and observe the dynamics of specific 
measures. Taking the building of the modern re-
search system as the starting point, we consider both 
the results of traditional tools that have been running 
for the last two decades and the emergence of a new 
set of policies and organizations. For empirical illus-
tration we use previous evaluations that have fo-
cused on performance, and analysis of a selection of 
new programmes. 
Our methodological approach has two compo-
nents. First, we focus on the social mechanisms that 
shape the results of cross-sector dynamics in pro-
jects, human resources programmes and interface 
organizations. The analysis highlights several draw-
backs that can be considered as failures. Second, we 
focus on the emerging trend from mainly project-
based and short-term links to new organizations and 
more stable forms of CSRC. We investigate this 
trend through successive waves of CSRC policies in 
terms of the rationale and the interests of the actors 
involved. The latest wave of tools, consisting of 
more structured means of collaboration, is explained 
by the emergence of new actors in a multi-level po-
litical system that tries to overcome the failure of 
traditional policies. 
Spain’s political and economic context 
The construction of a ‘mode 1’ research system 
The transition to democracy that started in 1978 pre-
sented a departure from the old model of industrial 
support based on strong public research organiza-
tions (PROs) close to the corporate capitalism of the 
dictatorship. The emerging goals of science and 
technology policy in the 1980s were to develop 
R&D practices and institutional forms that were 
commonplace in most western democracies. The 
policy trend can be labelled as an effort to build a 
‘mode 1’ research system (Gibbons et al., 1994). 
The ‘right institutions’ at that time were considered 
to be a modern structure for science support based 
on the Mertonian reward system, together with a 
technology policy detached from political and cor-
porate influences.2 In the case of science, the aim 
was to create research-based universities and ad-
vanced institutes by establishing funding schemes 
encouraging competitive projects, properly evaluat-
ed publications and research training. For industry, 
the priorities were to establish a new framework for 
the development of dynamic firms, where the re-
structuring of public conglomerates and highly sub-
sidized industrial sectors were necessary steps to 
overcome the autarkical economy. 
As a result, state3 R&D policy was based on a du-
al system for priorities and funding: a group of pro-
grammes and mechanisms for academic science 
(mainly under the National R&D Plan of 1987 and 
the associated evaluation agency — ANEP — which 
specialized in academic science) and a set of eco-
nomic incentives and promotion schemes for firms 
operated by another specialized agency (the Centre 
for Industrial Technological Development). In fact, 
explicit policies frequently claimed to align public 
support of science with the technological and  
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innovation strategies of the industrial sectors (Dora-
do and Oro, 1991). The practical implementation of 
tools for very different needs resulted in science pol-
icy (directed toward researchers in universities and 
public research institutes) disconnected from tech-
nology and innovation policy, managed by industry 
policy-makers. 
System failure in the Spanish policy system 
Three sets of factors arising from this arrangement 
generated barriers that hinder CSRC: industrial in-
novation capabilities; rules governing the academic 
sector; and the bifurcated nature of public policies. 
Industrial innovation capability 
Most accounts of the Spanish industrial base point to 
the structural conditions that hinder innovation 
(OEP, 2005): the specialization in low and medium 
technological content, with a notable presence of 
construction and services, especially tourism; the 
small size of firms; labour force productivity; and, 
consequently, scarce private investments in R&D. 
Few corporations in Spain have a strong technology 
base and the larger national firms are concentrated in 
the service sector. Other bigger firms resulted from 
the off-shoring process of international corporations 
that retain their R&D divisions in other countries. 
This industrial structure has created few incentives 
for interest groups to create large public–private 
partnerships. Instead, smaller firms prefer one-to-
one projects and avoid investments in joint ventures. 
Regulation of the academic sector 
Universities and PROs are public bureaucracies 
governed by state laws, where tenured researchers 
and professors are public servants. Hiring and mo-
bility of personnel are subject to rigid administrative 
procedures. Part-time appointments of researchers 
are very restricted and temporary cross-sector mobil-
ity for professors usually means the loss of career 
advantages. Moreover, contract research between 
sectors is also highly regulated, especially the ex-
change of economic resources in both directions. 
Until very recently universities were not allowed to 
invest in innovative business or to be official part-
ners in new firms. These arrangements have to be 
overseen and approved by several external bodies 
and pose management constraints on creating new 
organizational forms (Sebastián and Muñoz, 2006). 
Bifurcated public policy 
The dual public policy consisting of science agen-
cies versus technology and innovation agencies has 
meant they are governed by different rationales. In 
science agencies the aim has been to strengthen the 
once-precarious research base of universities using 
management tools that favour individual scientific 
merit. In technology and innovation agencies, man-
agement procedures in the agencies distributing 
funds for innovation have been detached from scien-
tific peer-review practices. Innovation policies have 
placed an emphasis on accountability and the in-
crease of firm turnover (Fernández-Esquinas et al., 
2011). Collaboration tools have been one-sided only, 
coming from one of the policy domains. In sum, 
public bodies in charge of both funding agencies 
have seen few strategic advantages in adopting poli-
cy innovations that overcome rigid boundaries, es-
pecially those that are high-risk and costly such as 
collaborative centres. 
The combination of these factors has produced a 
system failure in terms of both promoting interaction 
across the sectors and supporting the interest of ac-
tors in doing so. The limitation in firms’ technologi-
cal capability has been an important barrier to 
establishing strategic links with universities, since 
the activities they are eager to engage with are driv-
en by the need for technical assistance leading to 
immediate productive and commercial outcomes. On 
the university side the regulations have been highly 
restrictive and collaboration has not been part of the 
recognized formal mission for academics. For aca-
demics the incentives to collaborate with industry 
have not been consistent with indicators for career 
development or recognition. 
Finally, in the absence of coordination there has 
been a lack of horizontal integration between minis-
terial departments (Muñoz, 2001). More recent de-
velopments have sought to overcome this by funding 
bigger projects and adding multiple stakeholders to 
the partnerships, but the orientation toward different 
constituencies has handicapped the possibilities of 
spanning boundaries between organizational forms 
or creating hybrid organizational arrangements. 
The rise of a multi-level governance system 
Another resilient feature of the Spanish innovation 
system is its multi-level character. The reconstruc-
tion of the science system coincided with the emer-
gence of the regions as new active agents. A 
devolution process started in 1978, enabling regional 
governments to establish their own science, research 
and innovation policies. The Constitutional Act con-
siders R&D as a ‘concurrent competence’, meaning 
that both levels of government have the capacity to 
implement policies, although the state retains the 
competence for coordination (Tortosa, 2006). 
Regional governments’ policies have been grow-
ing steadily. Priorities were first focused primarily 
on agricultural research, but later moved toward in-
novation and development more generally. Regional 
governments were also given responsibility for fund-
ing and the management of universities and research 
facilities in hospitals. However, the pace and direc-
tion of change has differed considerably across the 
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regions. With few exceptions, such as in the Basque 
Country, the early trend during the 1980s and 1990s 
was to support academic science because of the need 
to strengthen the scientific capacities of an expand-
ing university sector. Later developments have re-
sulted in heterogeneous regional systems in terms of 
the specific combination of resources. A comparison 
of regions shows significant differences in the status 
of universities in Navarra and Catalonia, firm asso-
ciations in the Basque Country or PROs in Madrid 
(Buesa et al., 2006). 
Currently R&D expenditure by regional govern-
ments is about 50% of total public expenditure, alt-
hough the main regional programmes are 
concentrated in the bigger regions. Madrid, Catalo-
nia, Andalusia, the Basque Country and Valencia 
combined account for more than 80% of R&D 
(ICONO, 2008). At the same time, European agen-
cies have also started to play an important role, both 
as a source of funding for academic research and for 
the development of firm-based infrastructures, espe-
cially in regions and suburban areas with a lower 
GDP. This situation has given rise to a complex sys-
tem. Spain has the dynamics of a federal state, but 
lacks the institutions and mechanisms for coordina-
tion that are generally found in countries with a fed-
eral structure. This has resulted in a fragmented 
policy framework, with only an implicit division of 
policy responsibility. 
An overview of traditional cross-sector  
research collaboration 
The more recent wave of Spanish CSRC policies 
contrasts with earlier policies in a number of ways: 
earlier initiatives were directed more toward one-to-
one, short-term and small-scale arrangements, with 
an orientation towards activities with relatively low 
levels of scientific content. Other important features 
are the difficulties for vertical policy integration; 
although the state is the main political actor for regu-
lation and funding, a common trend has been the 
predominance of bottom-up initiatives by a diversi-
fied set of actors, including not only regional gov-
ernments, but also universities and industry 
associations. The examples we use are projects, ‘in-
terface’ organizations and human resources pro-
grammes since they provide relevant examples of 
mechanisms influencing the outcomes. We will con-
centrate only on the main drawbacks because they 
help to explain the rationale for emerging trends. 
Project-focused policies 
Projects have traditionally been the main form of 
CSRC. Dating back to 1968 when they were called 
concerted projects, similar initiatives have been in 
place albeit with different names and scope (Acosta 
and Modrego, 2001). They have offered a subsidy of 
around 50% towards a project led by a firm in  
collaboration with a university or PRO, usually for 
three years. Developments in the 1980s and 1990s 
led to diversification, ranging from more fundamen-
tal research to innovation. 
A later programme launched in 2000 (the PROF-
IT programme) aimed more explicitly to strengthen 
the financial capacity of firms using repayable inter-
est-free loans as the main tool.4 Although CSRC was 
a specific goal, it was in fact combined with many 
other criteria in selection processes. The preference 
was for projects closer to the market (pre-
development, demonstration, and viability studies), 
and also for those with higher investment and there-
fore in a better position to receive refundable credits. 
The participation of academic partners was one of 
the criteria (concerted projects were only a subset of 
the whole programme), but not a specific condition. 
Research has shown that cooperation is not a de-
termining aspect in project selection or funding 
(Santamaría et al., 2010), but plays a secondary role 
in supporting selection. In consequence, the concert-
ed projects programme did not foster large consortia 
and often posed the problem of the free-riding be-
haviour of firms (Joost, 2003). Given the absorptive 
capabilities of the industrial fabric, most projects 
tended to have less scientific content and fewer part-
ners. Therefore, project policies have impacted on 
the transfer of financial assets and the enhancement 
of innovation capacities, but not specifically on in-
creasing cooperation through large-scale endeavours 
with high R&D content. 
Interface organizations 
The Offices of Technology Transfer (OTTs) are the 
main organizational form for promoting CSRC. 
Originally started as a state programme, OTTs de-
veloped into a network of offices owned by universi-
ties whose main function was the management of 
academics’ consulting activities (Castro Martínez et 
al., 2008). Professors have traditionally provided a 
wide range of services including technical assis-
tance, informal advice, and training as a way of rais-
ing salaries and complementing scarce university 
resources. For firms, this channel has been a way to 
obtain assistance in a country lacking an extensive 
sector for private R&D consultancy. Universities 
have tried to control and prevent conflicts of interest 
and to orient activities towards greater scientific 
content. But even today decentralization is still a re-
silient feature of CSRC practices since most activi-
ties are carried out individually (Ramos-Vielba and 
Fernández-Esquinas, 2009). Only the more formal 
arrangements, usually bigger projects and exploita-
tion agreements, are managed conjointly with OTTs. 
Technology centres were developed during the 
1980s to support associations of firms and regional 
governments for renewing traditional industries. As a 
consequence, they were mostly concentrated in re-
gions with firms in sectors such as metal, tool ma-
chinery, food, textiles and wood (mainly in the 
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Basque Country and Valencia). Although formally 
private, they have been heavily sponsored by the pub-
lic sector. Their main feature was their direct support 
to firms. The public subsidies were defined according 
to the needs of each particular industrial sector. Other 
revenues came from direct contracts with firms or col-
laborative projects requiring their participation (Giral, 
1999). This feature has influenced the specialization 
and the services offered, consisting of laboratories 
and testing, assessment and training adapted to firms’ 
needs. The main concern has been solving immediate 
technical problems to maintaining competitiveness, 
through process innovation (Olazarán et al., 2009). 
The main drawback is the sparse contract R&D re-
sources from firms and therefore the possibilities for 
acquiring scientific input. This is why state policy has 
provided funding, and adapted legislation, to permit 
participation in public calls for projects, either with 
firms or university researchers. 
Science parks were expanded during the 1990s and 
run as private corporations led by regional govern-
ments and universities, together with city councils 
and private partners. While councils provided land to 
foster urban development, universities and regional 
governments used new campuses and European funds 
to create innovation facilities (COTEC, 2000). How-
ever, the main problem faced by most parks was that 
of attracting potentially innovative firms. The scarcity 
of innovative businesses has created impediments in 
establishing university start-ups. 
Human resource initiatives 
Human resources programmes have been specifical-
ly designed to bridge the mobility gap. The research 
training scheme includes doctoral theses carried out 
in collaboration with a firm, contracts for postdocs 
to work in industrial laboratories and public aid for 
firms hiring R&D personnel. Other categories sup-
port exchanges between firm-based researchers and 
university professors (González-González et al., 
2007). The decisive characteristic of this tool was its 
real cross-sector nature, which paradoxically also 
meant a lack of embeddedness of people moving 
from one sector into another. Research training is  
attached to a doctoral programme. The mobility of 
stable workers did not affect appointments in the 
other sector, since both professors and company re-
searchers were officially still working for their orig-
inal organizations. The results in terms of real 
mobility have depended on the scientific capabilities 
of the firm. The orientation has been toward aca-
demic science when the firms lacked R&D content. 
Therefore, the expectations and professional trajec-
tories of both PhD students and postdocs have been 
mostly within universities (Fernández-Esquinas, 
2002). Again, the main difficulty is finding firms 
able to provide both an adequate environment for 
training and the prospect of professional develop-
ment for researchers. 
The instruments mentioned above have spread across 
the country. In particular, the three formal associa-
tions of OTTs, technology parks and technology cen-
tres respectively are jointly responsible for a very 
important part of the process of knowledge transfer. 
They are institutionalized as actors organized around 
networks with a significant degree of autonomy.5 Re-
gional governments have been one of the main sup-
porters of these structures. At the state level the 
National R&D Plan has concentrated on projects and 
financial aid as the main instruments to foster collabo-
ration with public partners. Over the years there has 
been a tendency to increase direct aid to firms due to 
the higher capacity of the state, in comparison to most 
regional governments, to use repayable loans in con-
cert with tax incentives.6 Loans have constituted the 
main increase in the R&D budget over the last 10 
years. Financial aid makes up 60% of total public ex-
penditure in R&D and 85% of public support to pri-
vate R&D (ICONO, 2008). On the other hand, the 
central government has been reluctant to support local 
projects, and other tools such as block grants have 
been lacking until very recently. 
This implicit division of work has produced an 
historically based lock-in for several years. The con-
struction of the modern research system has been 
around a set of antecedent conditions that framed a 
specific trajectory of institutional development and 
consolidation. This has been difficult to reverse dur-
ing the critical period of the expansion of the public 
sector. During the 1990s and part of the 2000s the 
central government, through the National R&D Plan, 
has faced the need to support a growing number of 
universities and researchers, in addition to national 
and international research infrastructure. On the oth-
er hand, since most of the resources for firms have 
been directed to financial aid, this has left few op-
portunities to invest in strategic options and develop 
policy innovations. 
The policy shift for cross-sector  
research collaboration 
A new trend starting in the 2000s has consisted of 
broadening the pool of resources to foster innovation, 
and stimulate the formation of new organizational 
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forms to span the boundaries between separate do-
mains. There were two imperatives driving this shift. 
First, structural barriers and lack of incentives for 
larger public–private partnerships, targeting radical 
innovations, have been interpreted more explicitly as 
reasons for system failure (Molero and Buesa, 
1998). Second, the emergence of new structural 
conditions has drawn some agencies into the policy 
process with new ideas and different expectations. 
A new policy environment 
Economic growth through the early 2000s and the 
availability of additional public funds to overcome 
the previous lock-in produced by the growth of the 
academic sector and the decentralized structures for 
knowledge transfer have transformed the opportuni-
ty context. Moreover, development of the multi-
level state has led to a more complex arrangement of 
policy interests and intentions. Regional govern-
ments have gained political legitimacy, with increas-
ing competencies and more economic resources. A 
process of policy learning has also allowed regional 
departments to develop plans with distinctive fea-
tures. New agencies with an interest in national sci-
ence policy have generated responses from agencies 
such as health and energy, to launch their own pro-
grammes and specialized centres. Moreover, univer-
sities and PROs are now more able to act as 
independent partners because legal reforms have 
granted them more autonomy to hire research per-
sonnel. Some universities and PROs are now strate-
gic actors competing for both resources and 
establishing alliances. 
Meanwhile, industrial policy trends at several 
government levels have placed an emphasis on the 
mobilization of R&D capabilities to promote a more 
knowledge-intensive industrial sector. Through the 
2000s there has been a much more explicit align-
ment with the ‘collaboration paradigm’. The public 
sector is being used more directly to increase the 
scale of arrangements by aggregating large firms, 
SMEs and universities around enabling technolo-
gies, and to create competitive environments through 
agglomeration of new firms in innovative spaces 
(Trullén, 2006). This trend is also facilitated by the 
development of firms. The economic growth of the 
country has resulted in bigger industrial firms with 
absorptive capacities that are able to interact with 
the public sector. 
Science policy trends have resulted in structural 
changes stemming from legal reforms through two 
subsets of measures aimed at reducing boundaries. 
The first set is contained in the new Universities Law 
introduced in 2000. It encourages researcher mobility 
by engaging professors to undertake R&D in firms, 
permitting full-time appointments, and facilitates the 
hiring of technicians to support research teams that 
have contracts with companies. This in turn has facili-
tated a shift from mainly individual consultancy to 
more collective projects. The laws also allow the  
establishment of public–private centres in universities 
and the creation of start-ups. The second set relates to 
the amendment to the Science Law in 2002, which ba-
sically broadens the scope of PROs to participate in or 
set up firms and eliminates previous restrictions re-
lated to the exploitation of patents. 
A new rationale for cross-sector  
research collaboration 
CSRC is now being promoted in two major ways. 
First, through the creation of large projects that con-
centrate capacities around strategic research.  
Second, through the creation of environments that 
encourage the co-location of firms, universities, in-
terface organizations and advanced service suppliers. 
Recent policy initiatives assume that the diversifi-
cation of partnerships is a more efficient approach  
to stimulate R&D and radical innovations. The  
rationale appears to be the need to steer high-quality 
fundamental research toward economic relevance, 
and to encourage concentration of resources in re-
search fields of strategic importance for the economy 
and society. The new mechanisms explicitly seek to 
attract major players in well-defined sectors through 
the creation of consortia and networks. The chief ex-
ample is the Ingenio 2010 Scheme. This was launched 
in 2005 as a major initiative in economic reforms 
(OEP, 2005).7 The policy mechanisms seek to match 
science and innovation through consortia of multiple 
academic and industrial partners around enabling 
technologies, such as the consortia in the field of in-
formation and communication technology (ICT) and 
the CENIT programme. Similarly, excellence net-
works for bio-medicine research (CIBER networks) 
endeavour to generate large multi-institutional re-
search where basic, clinical and epidemiological  
research can be more effectively integrated. 
Measures to shape the innovation environment 
aim to create critical mass by locating new firms and 
high-tech SMEs close to universities and research 
centres. Various governments have adopted 
measures of this kind, which vary in terms of pro-
gramme size and scope. A good Spanish example is 
the Campus Programme of Excellence, the first to 
support the Spanish university system by providing 
block grants (Rubiralta and Delgado, 2010). The 
main objective of this programme is to create envi-
ronments conducive to the integration of social uni-
versity life, attracting students and researchers in 
order to set up scientific facilities and firms with 
high added value. Initiating this programme required 
the coordinated action of regional governments, uni-
versities and economic agents. 
Once these organizations and interface spaces are 
created, a common problem has been the absence of 
personnel with the capacity or incentives to interact. 
To overcome this problem some organizations have 
been subject to specific policies aimed at creating ca-
pacities (CICYT, 2000, 2004). In this respect the state 
has helped to institutionalize some of the structures. 
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For example, after 2002, science parks received spe-
cific help from the state through a programme that 
provides financial assistance to firms to locate in the-
se spaces. Other organizations aimed at bridging sec-
tors, such as incubators and infrastructure for clusters, 
were also located in science parks with the aim of  
creating innovative environments (COTEC, 2000). 
In the case of the technology centres, although their 
funding comes mainly from the private sector (55%) 
(Callejón et al., 2007), the state government and espe-
cially the regional governments have contributed to 
their consolidation, frequently using universities (also 
dependent on regional governments) as intermediar-
ies. For example, the Support Programme for Tech-
nology Centres, which was re-launched after 2000 as 
part of the National R&D Plan, offers grants for col-
laborative projects and contracts for postdoctoral fel-
lows. This situation has led to a diversity of new and 
more stable centres for public–private research col-
laboration that can lend service to innovation 
through their combined capacities. 
From project-based to  
organizational arrangements 
In Spain, new organizational forms for collaboration 
emerged as the result of stakeholders’ reactions to 
the system failure. The failures were generated by 
the limitations of both traditional science policies 
and the structures of universities and PROs. As a 
consequence, there is neither a single national 
scheme nor a unique CSRC model or federal net-
work of collaborative research centres, such as in 
Australia or the USA. The variety of new structures 
basically depends on the agreements, expectations 
and capabilities of the partners, as well as the avail-
ability of funding. 
The absence of a unified R&D policy and the lack 
of any registry of cooperative research centres make 
this issue difficult to study empirically. Neverthe-
less, it is possible to use a simple typology to ob-
serve and describe the emergence of hybrid 
organizational arrangements. For that purpose we 
have used the preliminary classification outlined by 
CREST (2004). Their classification specifies wheth-
er the initiative originates in the private or the public 
sector, depending on where the largest amount of 
funding in each case generally comes from. In addi-
tion, we have included a third intermediate option 
for organizations specifically created to attract pri-
vate financing. The examples provided for each type 
in the classification are aimed to illustrate the ra-
tionale of stakeholders and the bottom-up processes 
driving a diversified set of CSRC structures. 
Privately driven initiatives 
The so-called ‘enterprise chairs’ in universities are 
mainly financed by private-sector contributions.  
Besides academic activities, they pursue research 
projects in subjects of interest to both the companies 
involved and the university. The firm proposes and 
orientates these projects and the university provides 
the infrastructure and human resources. A good ex-
ample is located at the Polytechnic University of 
Catalonia, where 17 company professorships have 
been established covering various industrial sectors 
from transport, energy innovation, engineering and 
ICT. They represent a measure halfway between 
philanthropy and the beginning of a strategic associ-
ation. This is a shift away from the more decentral-
ized relations among individual teachers and firms 
providing consultancy towards a more long-term and 
socially visible form of collaboration. The underly-
ing effect is to institutionalize what were previously 
loose-knit relationships. 
A privately initiated research centre within a uni-
versity or PRO is a more complex process due to the 
financing and coordination required. The most rele-
vant case is the agreement between the former 
Pharmatia-Pfizer and the Spanish National Research 
Council (CSIC) in 1996 to create a corporate labora-
tory inside the National Centre of Biotechnology 
(one of the institutes of CSIC). This later developed 
as a Pfizer and CSIC partnership through the De-
partment of Immunology and Oncology. The centre 
initiated projects and built basic research pro-
grammes on epidemiology, clinical research, health 
and pharmacology. This agreement is considered an 
example of successful collaboration, although at the 
beginning it faced criticism for improper practice for 
selling public resources to a private company. One 
of the main reasons for implementing this model 
was the difficulty in establishing a partnership using 
the administrative rules operating in regular CSIC 
centres. The rationale in this case was thus to over-
come institutional failure (Martín-Lomas, 2002). 
Although technology centres receive considerable 
public support, their distinctive feature is their 
strong orientation to providing technological ser-
vices to firms (around 60% of total funding comes 
through such service provision). Technology centres 
in many cases grew out of business associations that 
required innovation services, and were not intended 
as a tool for cross-sector research with the academic 
sector. There are several generations of centres with 
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very different profiles: some of them are active 
R&D performers, while others concentrate on 
providing services with less scientific content, de-
pending on the industry sector and the role played by 
regional governments. 
The growth in the number of technology centres 
has been due to three converging processes. First, an 
explicit policy to increase capabilities for critical 
stages of technological development and to under-
take long-term endeavours to increase the value-
added of the services provided. As a result, some re-
gional governments are reorienting their funding to 
target radical innovations (Callejón et al., 2007). Se-
cond, evaluations of the support programme 
launched by the National R&D Plan (Modrego et al., 
2003) has resulted in an orientation toward bigger 
and more ambitious collaborative projects, in order 
to increase their critical mass. Third, centres them-
selves are reorienting their activities to obtain alter-
native funding, especially from the European 
Framework Programme, which implies more em-
phasis on acquiring capabilities to establish strategic 
alliances with international partners. In sum, the 
technology centres have intensified their cross-sector 
collaboration to increase their own research capaci-
ties as a strategic element for maintaining their level 
of technological competitiveness. 
Public–private corporations and consortia 
There are also cases where partnerships have been 
driven by the public sector in order to increase fund-
ing from firms, either using grants to create large 
projects or new organizations for matching the fund-
ing provided by private partners. The following two 
examples represent options emerging from the State 
and one of the regional governments. 
The CENIT programme (National Strategic Con-
sortia for Technical Research) has created consortia 
comprising large firms, SMEs and universities. 
Started in 2006, it was specifically aimed at 
strengthening collaboration between the public and 
private sectors involving researchers working at dif-
ferent parts of the value chain. The outstanding fea-
ture of the CENIT programme is its financing of 
large-scale projects. The main objective is the gener-
ation of new knowledge that is useful in the creation 
of new products, processes and services and for the 
integration of technologies of strategic interest 
(OEP, 2005). 
Some initiatives seek to generate collaboration 
through shared financial contributions among part-
ners. The objective is to attract private financing 
through the commitment to matching amounts pro-
vided by each company. An example is the Techno-
logical Corporation of Andalusia (CTA), a private 
foundation promoted by the Andalusian regional 
government. CTA participants include firms, univer-
sities, research centres, financial entities and region-
al governments. Firms pay an annual subscription 
fee. Initially, this involved mainly large companies 
but later SMEs also joined the consortia. The re-
gional governments match the private financing and 
commit support to universities. The CTA finances 
cooperative projects through competitive evaluation 
processes, with the presence of at least one research 
group from the public sector being a requirement 
(CTA, 2009). 
Publicly driven initiatives 
Funding for ‘publicly driven’ initiatives generally 
comes from the institution taking the initiative, usu-
ally because the goals are closer to state-of-the-art 
research. Examples include network of excellence 
centres and independent institutes derived from a 
combination of different efforts by public admin-
istrations and firm associations. 
The Cooperative Research Centres (CIC) pro-
gramme launched by the Basque regional govern-
ment is the only public plan to create a 
homogeneous network of excellence centres. This 
model draws on pre-existing international pro-
grammes like the Australian Cooperative Research 
Centres (CRCs). Centres are conceived within the 
CIC programme as organizations devoted to special-
ized research in a specific scientific or technological 
field considered as strategic for the economic and 
social development of the region. At present the CIC 
programme covers seven sectors: energy; nano-
sciences; micro/nanotechnologies; biomaterials; bio-
technology; biomedicine; and tourism. Most centres 
have been launched using public funds. They seek to 
achieve research excellence through the recruitment 
of highly respected researchers. In the second stage 
of development the programme is expected to take 
advantage of the synergies derived from the experi-
ence and to benefit the system as a whole (CICNet-
work, 2007). 
Several independent institutes have been created 
with inputs from universities, governments and in-
dustry. In some cases the private partner is an asso-
ciation of firms working in the same sector and 
cooperating with a public agency toward common 
goals. The following are some relevant examples 
oriented to translational research and manufacturing: 
The Spanish National Cardiovascular Research 
Centre (CNIC) works mainly in association with a 
PRO and a group of large corporations linked to 
prestigious international scientific programmes. 
Postgraduate training is also a objective. Such mod-
els are created independently as a means of finding 
more flexibility in the rules and methods of financial 
control and, above all, the hiring and managing of 
personnel (CNIC, 2009). 
The Centre for Scientific and Technological Com-
petence in Transformed Meat Products (CECOC-
PTC) is a consortium of PROs, at both  
national and regional level, and a business associa-
tion. Created in 2001 using funding from the  
National R&D Plan to support competence institutes 
(CICYT, 2000), this centre was formed by an  
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agreement between the National Organization of Ag-
ricultural Research (INIA), the Research and Agricul-
tural Technology Institute (IRTA) and the Spanish 
Federation of Food and Drinks Industries (FIAB). 
The CECOC-PTC is a network centre with a stable 
organizational structure and with considerable re-
search autonomy. Coordination of the network, as 
well as its administrative and financial management, 
is handled by the IRTA, a public corporation owned 
by the regional government of Catalonia in the field of 
food and agriculture research. This centre is an exam-
ple of multiple partners with overlapping interests 
working at several government levels (IRTA, 2009). 
Mapping the trend towards  
organizational stability 
The above examples show that CSRC structures in 
Spain are the result of the coalescing of interests 
across different sectors, organizations and research-
ers. The heterogeneity of CSRC models reveals dif-
ferent attempts to overcome many traditional system 
failures. This situation has created a wide range of 
mechanisms depicted in Figure 1. The vertical axis 
presents the core activities from advancing basic 
knowledge to commercialization, according to the 
explicit emphasis conveyed by each modality. The 
horizontal axis presents the degrees of organization-
al stability of each CSRC initiative. By organiza-
tional stability we mean interactions that are more 
long-term, independently led, administratively  
autonomous, and involve a larger number of re-
searchers and organizational partners. 
This classification reveals different types of tools 
along the horizontal axis. First, we identify monetary 
support regardless of any further organizational ef-
forts by the firm (for instance free-interest credits or 
fiscal aid), followed by short-term projects. Second, 
more stable formats appear such as the consortia 
created for large longer-lasting projects and the net-
worked virtual centres. 
The schema also shows the emergence of collab-
oration tools with greater scope to link quality sci-
ence with innovation, which is also reflected in 
ever more stable organizational forms. The preva-
lent trend appears to be from lower to higher or-
ganizational stability. Complementarily, evolution 
along the vertical axis reflects a propensity for 
higher scientific content and technological devel-
opment. Another relevant aspect is the apparent 
consistency of the timeframe of the several waves 
of national and regional science and innovation 
policies with the emergence of more stable organi-
zational forms. 
When a time scale is overlaid on Figure 1 (top 
horizontal axis), we observe few exceptions from the 
general trend. In fact, few inconsistencies emerge 
with the stability axis (bottom) in terms of later poli-
cies coinciding with relatively more and more stable 
organizational forms. Projects date mostly from the 
1980s, while interface organizations (TTOs, S&T 
parks) started in the late 1980s and developed with 
technology centres in the 1990s. Institutional collab-
oration and new organizational forms aimed at 
matching higher scientific content with productive 
goals emerged mainly after 2000. Thus the progres-
sive convergence of organizational stability with 
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scientific and technological based CSRC initiatives 
is consistent with the time frame. 
Conclusions 
Using the concept of system failure as an analytical 
device has enabled us to identify blockages that hin-
der the effective networking between the compo-
nents that make up the Spanish research system. It 
has also enabled us to identify some useful lessons 
for understanding CSRC policies and their impact. 
First, the nature of the industrial capability can 
inhibit effective linkages. The predominance of 
SMEs with low technological base, a lack of both 
organizational ability and skilled human resources, 
and the orientation of some large companies to ac-
tivities of low technological content, present major 
barriers to research collaboration. Financial support 
for short-term grants and repayable loans may orient 
firms toward technical services and low-risk applied 
research, rather than long-term capacity-building. 
Second, research collaboration can be inhibited by 
regulations and practices that fail to generate incen-
tives to collaborate within the research system. 
Evaluation procedures for individuals and teams 
within the academic sector offer examples. Similar-
ly, peer-review processes oriented only to academic 
outputs can create situations where individuals are 
trapped by ‘excellence’ criteria that place little value 
on technology transfer. Moreover, the existence of 
only one career system, where promotion relies al-
most entirely on publications, offers little encour-
agement for the involvement of professors and 
researchers in different types of cooperative interac-
tions. A more balanced strategy is needed to encour-
age or even enable scientists to work across industry 
and academic sectors. 
Third, horizontal integration between depart-
ments, and vertical integration between levels of 
government, makes coordination difficult. Science 
and innovation policies have followed independent 
paths for the past three decades leading to a com-
plex, dual-policy system. This fragmentation is par-
ticularly acute for catch-up countries with low 
private investment in R&D such as Spain. The con-
solidation of multi-level governance in the absence 
of coordination mechanisms has resulted in a very 
complex model, with few synergies between region-
al and central programmes. Policies for promoting 
collaboration have been conditioned by path de-
pendence for some years, maintaining the separation 
of organizational domains. The process observed in 
the Spanish innovation system highlights the im-
portance of the institutional set-up in constraining 
the options for agencies to coordinate innovative 
policies. 
In spite of these systemic failures, we have ob-
served a trend away from project-based cooperation 
to more structured and stable forms of research col-
laboration. This trend raises important issues for the 
governance of innovation. On the one hand, it is ex-
pected that these new arrangements contribute to 
improvements in cross-sector linkages. They imply 
the formation of more stable arrangements to carry 
out complex activities, and sometimes the emer-
gence of hybrid organizations. In accordance with 
assumptions that economic returns of both public 
and private R&D depend on the quality of the sci-
ence–innovation interface, increasing complexity in 
public–private partnerships appears likely. Bigger 
and more stable organizational forms suggest  
more opportunities at the interface between science 
and industry, creating critical mass around key  
technologies. 
On the other hand, some research suggests that 
the division of work in CSRC should be in accord-
ance with territorial proximity. That means that re-
gional level programmes may be more effective in 
facilitating process innovation, whereas national and 
international programmes should focus more gener-
ally on scientific endeavour (Fernández-Ribas, 
2009). However, the policy trend described above 
points toward a situation that is rather the reverse. 
The policy division for the upper level of govern-
ment appears to concentrate more on improving ab-
sorptive capacities in firms, while the lower level 
tries to fill the excellence gap with new hybrid or-
ganizations targeting radical innovations. Whether 
this is a promising trend or just another consequence 
of systemic failures is a matter for further research. 
Notes 
1. GERD is 1.37% of gross domestic product, of which 63% is 
spent by the public sector; and 65% of researchers are em-
ployed in the university and government sectors. Spain is now 
the tenth-ranking country for scientific articles registered on 
ISI-Web of Science (ICONO, 2008). 
2. The main legal reforms in the 1980s aimed at constructing a 
modern research system are the University Reform Act of 
1983 and the Science and Technology Act of 1986. Policy 
tools were included mainly under the National R&D Plan start-
ing in 1987 (Sebastián and Muñoz, 2006). 
3. When we refer to the state we mean the general administra-
tion of the state. Since 1978 Spain has been transformed from 
a very centralized country into a quasi-federal, political system. 
The regional level of government consists of 17 autonomous 
communities (regional governments). 
4. Subsidies are combined with interest-free loans to support 
specific projects, especially those in cooperation with universi-
ties (firms may receive a subsidy to pay a maximum of 70% of 
the collaboration contract with a university, although this con-
tract should be less than 20% of the total cost of the project). 
On the other hand, firms receiving repayable loans have to 
provide a pay-back guarantee from a bank. For SMEs this can 
be considered as a push for investing in projects that can gen-
erate cash in the short term. 
5. Currently OTTs are present in all universities and PROs, and 
also in many public hospitals. The network is managed con-
jointly with the association of university rectors <www. 
redotriuniversidades.net>. The association of science parks — 
APTE — comprises 45 members and 36 associates from all 
over the country <www.apte.org>. Technology centres consti-
tute a federation — FEDIT — including 65 centres from most 
of the regions <www.fedit.com>. 
6. Tax breaks are also a widely used tool to promote collabora-
tion. Firms are able to deduce contract with universities as part 
of the R&D-related expenditure. Currently Spain has one of 
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the most favourable tax exemption schemes for R&D and in-
novation of all OECD countries. 
7. Interestingly, Ingenio 2010 was launched as an independent 
programme, and only afterwards incorporated in the National 
R&D Plan. One of the main criticisms of Ingenio 2010 was the 
lack of coordination with other state and regional agencies 
<www.ingenio2010.es>. 
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